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The Idea of the Constitution as 
Hard Law 
William W. Van Alstyne 
Constitution. The system or body of fundamental principles according to which a 
nation, state, or body politic is constituted and governed. This may be embodied in 
successive concessions on the part of the sovereign power or it may be formally set forth in 
a document framed and adopted on a particular occasion, as in the Constitution of the 
United States. In the case of a written constitution, the name is sometimes applied to the 
document embodying it. In either case it is assumed or specifically provided that the 
constitution is more fundamental than any particular law, and contains the principles 
with which all legislation must be in harmony. 
Oxford English Dictionary 
I 
The "idea" of the Constitution is generally thought to be well declared in 
the famous rhetoric1 of its Preamble. The idea was 
[T]o form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity[.] 
But the idea of the Constitution was to do these things by making such 
alterations in the Articles of Confederation of 1781, as were deemed necessary 
satisfactorily to secure those ends. So the idea of the Constitution draws one 
down from the rhetoric of its preamble to see more concretely what those 
alterations were. It is they, generically, that constitute the idea carried into 
effect. 
The first of these alterations, doubtless the most important at the time, lay 
in the new enumerations of greater legislative powers, to be vested in a newly 
William W. Van Alstyne is William R. and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke 
University. This paper was prepared for the Plenary Session program, "The Idea of the 
Constitution," held at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in Los 
Angeles on January 5, 1987. The paper has been prepared from a transcription of oral remarks, 
without the qualifications and citations one might expect in a formal paper. 
I. Rhetoric is "the art of prose," and it is "the study of the elements used in literature and 
public speaking." It is also "an affectation in prose or verse," and it is "the art of oratory, 
esp. the persuasive use of language to influence the thoughts and actions of listeners." 
American Heritage Dictionary 1114 (1971). The preamble is, perhaps, all of the above. 
C1987 by. the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 37 J. Legal Educ. 174 (1987). 
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constituted Congress,2 to meet the felt shortcomings widely experienced 
under the Articles of Confederation between 1781 and 1787. The second 
alteration lay in the additional imposition of certain restrictions on the 
powers of state legislaturess and separately on Congress, 4 albeit without a 
general bill of rights. Third, the Constitution broke off from Congress new 
executive and judicial departments.s And the enterprise was virtually fin-
ished with the new provisions in article V,6 to facilitate such additional 
amendments to the Constitution as subsequent experience might commend 
to the requisite national and state majorities, without the necessity of 
unanimous state consent, as the Articles of Confederation had required. 
Article VI then confirmed the supremacy of national law and of the Consti-
tution, exacting oaths of office from state as well as federal officials "to 
support this Constitution," once it were to take positive law effect. Lasdy, 
article VII set the means by which the new constitutional order would take 
effect, on approval by conventions, in not less than nine states. 
Beyond these constitutive considerations (of federalism, separation of 
powers, affirmatively-expressed restrictions, and the supremacy of the Con-
stitution itself), the idea of the Constitution was also to render the proposed 
readjustments of federal powers within a much more complicated frame-
work than the Articles of Confederation had done. In brief, the idea was to 
provide multiple offsets of power and of constituency, as a source of bal-
anced factionalism up and down the new government. 
2. Principally in what became article I, §8 of the Constitution, with the most significant 
emphasis put on the power to regulate national and international commerce free of state 
barriers, and the power to provide financial support for the national government without 
trusting to state levies. 
3. Principally in article I, §10 (including the prohibition on state laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts, coining money, entering into treaties, or adopting either bills of attainer or ex 
post facto laws), and also in article IV, large portions of which were essentially carried over 
from the Articles of Confederation (e.g., the interstate privileges and immunities clause). 
4. Principally in article I, §9, including a restriction on any prohibition of importation of 
"such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit" (i.e., slaves) 
prior to 1808, as well as restrictions on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws suspending 
habeas corpus, and certain laws taxing exports from any state or otherwise favoring one 
state's commerce over another. 
5. In the provisions of articles II and III, respectively. 
6. Article V provides: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: 
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand 
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the 
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
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Bicameralism, for instance, was introduced into Congress? first through 
the different electoral provisions, qualifications and terms of office respect-
ing each house separately,8 and then again through a differential allocation 
of certain powers separately vested in each. 9 The executive power was severed 
from Congress and vested in a president who had only a few independent 
powers,10 and made electable by a buffered, ad hoc political constituency of 
special electors twice removed from any direct, popular vote.11 The executive 
power was made somewhat more prepossessing, however, by being placed in 
the hands of a single office (rather than being fractionated among potential 
rival executive heads), and the president was granted a veto over Congress 
which could be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both houses of 
Congress. 
7. Under the Articles of Confederation (art. v), each state simply sent not less than two or more 
than seven delegates to Congress annually, with each state having one vote in Congress 
regardless of how many delegates it sent. 
8. Virtual state (rather than popular) representation was continued in the Senate, two senators 
from each state regardless of size, the senators to be chosen as each state legislature would 
determine, for substantial, six-year terms. (See art. I, §3, cl. 1, and compare the seventeenth 
amendment, adopted in 1913). As to the House, its members were to be "chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States" (art. I, §2, cl. 1), but "the people" eligible to make 
the choice were established by the Constitution as the same people already eligible by each 
state's own laws to vote for the more numerous branch of its own legislature. I d. Thus in 
this respect each state also retained full control of the eligible electorate, even for members 
of the House of Representatives. 
In v1ew of the numerous voting qualifications that existed among the states in 1787 (and 
for some time later), in no state were electors even for members of the House of Representa-
tives anything like a majority of the whole people in any state. Cf. the fourteenth amend· 
ment, §2 (penalizing House representation of states choosing to disqualify males over the 
age of 21 and not previously convicted of crimes), adopted in 1868; the fifteenth amendment 
(prohibiting restrictions by race), adopted in 1870; the nineteenth amendment (prohibiting 
restrictions by sex), adopted in 1920; the twenty-third amendment (granting three presiden· 
tial electors to District of Columbia residents), adopted in 1961; the twenty-fourth amend· 
ment (prohibiting poll taxes in respect to federal elections), adopted in 1964; the 
twenty-sixth amendment (prohibiting restrictions by age for those over 18), adopted in 
1971. Universal suffrage was not an idea of the Constitution. 
9. E.g., the reservation of Senate power alone over approval of appointments (including 
Supreme Court appointments) (art. II, §2, cl. 2); the reservation of Senate power alone over 
proposed treaties, hedged further by the additional requirement of approval by not less than 
two-thirds of those present. Note the different requirement, in contrast, that "all Bills for 
raising revenue shall originate in the House" (art. I, §7), and the requirement restricting 
impeachment initiatives to the House alone (art. I, §2, cl. 5), albeit with trial in the Senate 
(art. I, §3, cl. 6)). 
10. Compare the unprepossessing listing of executive powers in article II with the much richer 
enumeration for Congress in article I. There is little doubt that, nationally, Congress was 
meant to be primus inter pares i.e., a far more important body for substantive initiatives 
than the executive (or, of course, than the judiciary). 
II. Electors appointed in such manner as each state legislature should determine were to vote 
for the president and vice president for a four-year term; each state's electors were to equal in 
number the senators and representatives each state had in Congress, but no actual senator or 
representative could be picked as an elector, see art. II, §1, cl. 2. (See also the modification 
made by the twelfth amendment, adopted in 1804, and the presidential succession amend-
ment, the twenty-fifth, adopted in 1967, pursuant to which Gerald Ford became president 
following Richard Nixon's resignation, without election either as president or as vice 
· president. Mr. Ford was never elected to any office by a constituency larger than that of the 
single congressional district in Michigan which he had represented in the House. 
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In respect to the judicial power, the new provisions were equally distinc-
tive; the Constitution essentially made provision for a limited oligarchy, that 
is, an entrenched group of federal judges who would be subject neither to 
original election, possibilities of recall, periodic reappointment, nor even to 
the constraint of serving for limited terms. The judges might'indeed possess 
no great initiative powers ("of the purse or of the sword"), but in their 
insulated authority to say in each instance what the law was-in all the 
many kinds of cases confided to them by article III and by such acts of 
Congress as would soon be promulgated12, their institutional separation was 
unique. It is quite clear that a principal purpose in so providing for the 
judges was to remove them from politics and, to that extent at least, justify 
an expectation of professional detachment in their work. 
The Constitution, in separating out the judicial power so distinctly, as 
well as in ensuring federalism and in distributing the newly enumerated 
powers between Congress and the President-each with their distinctive con-
stituencies, different terms of office, the bicameralism of the one and the veto 
of the other and other checks and cross-checks-took the suggestions of 
mixed forms of limited government (from Montesquieu, Locke, and Poly-
bius,l3) with extraordinary seriousness, adapting them very pragmatically-
even ethnocentrically-to the American scene. 
So thorough was this adaptation that the idea of the Constitution in many 
ways is more like the idea of a Rube Goldberg machine than it is like 
anything else. The numerous provisions for myriad and multiple checks, 
various separations of power (vertically as well as horizontally), offsets of 
power, di££erentiated constituencies, varied terms of office-in a word, the 
mechanics of the Constitution-dominate the text of the Constitution, up to 
and including the provisions in article V of four different ways by which 
even amendments themselves may be made.14 Rube Goldberg was famous 
early this century as the "creator of extremely intricate diagrams of contrap-
tions designed to effect relatively simple results."15 His eccentric genius is of 
a piece with our Constitution as a political document of government; it is an 
12. E.g., the Judiciary Act of 1789, by far the most compreh~nsive singie piece of legislation 
adopted by the first Congress. 
13. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (1748), ed. David Carrithers (Berkeley, 1977). See also 
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), ed. W. Peden (1955); Federalist 
Papers: No. 48 (Madison) and No. 78 (Hamilton); John Locke, Two Treatises of Govern-
ment, ed. P. Laswell (1967); I The Histories of Polybius 467-73, trans. E.S. 
Shuckburgh (1962). 
14. Under article V (reproduced supra note 6), an amendment may be: (a) proposed by Congress 
and ratified by state legislatures; or (b) proposed by Convention and ratified by state legisla-
tures; or (c) proposed by Convention and ratified by state conventions; or (d) proposed by 
Congress and ratified by state conventions. But regardless of the procedUre, no amendment 
diluting state Senate representation can be made without an adversely affected state's 
consent. And prior to 1808, no amendment could be made banning "the migration or 
importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper," or 
imposing a "capitation or other direct" tax without apportionment by population, 
counting "three fifths of all other Persons" (e.g., slaves) with free persons. 
15. American Heritage Dictionary p. 565 (1971). 
178 Journal of Legal Education 
original Rube Goldberg machine that conforms to no pure or idealized 
governmental type.16 As for a number of its substantive provisions, 
moreover, without doubt they are accounted for more from the first necessity 
to "form a more perfect Union" (i.e. as a necessity to elicit the requisite 
number of nine ratifications}, than for any more exalted reason of philo· 
sophy or good government. I? 
n 
The world is now full of written constitutions,18 of which ours is but one 
example and by no means in any obvious way the best. It is characterized 
comparatively (i.e., in comparison with other national constitutions) by its 
extreme brevity. On its face, it does not explain itself nearly as elaborately or 
as well as many of the world's modem constitutions tend to do. Its mere 
seven articles and twenty-six amendments are overall far less lucid (and less 
integrated}, for instance, than the new (1977) Constitution of the Soviet 
Union, or the still newer (1982) Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China, each of which is substantially fuller and significantly more elaborate 
than our own.I9 
Even its enumerations of protected freedoms2° and of assured rights are 
noticeably shorter than the much fuller enumerations provided by many 
constitutions among the nations with written constitutions today. Many of 
these constitutions (again including the Soviet Union's) furnish an enumer-
ation of positive rights,21 moreover, none of which our Bill of Rights or the 
fourteenth amendment guarantee. 
Similarly, the several provisions respecting federalism in our Constitution 
are facially insubstantial in comparison with those contained in other mod-
em constitutions. The federalism provisions in our Constitution are much 
16. Compare the somewhat more effusive description by William Gladstone, on the occasion of 
the centennial of the Constitution: 
I have always regarded that Constitution as the most remarkable work known to me in 
modern times to have been produced by the human intellect, at a single stroke (so to 
speak), in its application to political affairs. 
Letter to the Committee in Charge of the Celebration of the centennial of the American 
Constitution, July 20, 1887. 
17. See, e.g., the two special limitations even on amending the Constitution supra note 17; they 
illustrate but a number of clauses one could cite. 
18. It was not always so. Recall that the English had no written constitution in 1787 (and still 
have none); that less than half of today's 160 national constitutions predate 1970; that a mere 
fifteen predate the Second World War; and that scarcely a half-dozen predate 1900 (the 
second oldest-"second" to ours-is Norway's, dating from 1814). 
19. The former runs to more than 170 articles; the latter to 138. Each lays out the rationale 
and governing system much more intelligibly than does the Constitution of the United 
States (though intelligibility and coherence are, of course, by no means exclusive tests of 
constitutional stature, as parts of the balance of this brief essay may suggest). 
20. E.g., article I, §§9 and 10, the Bill of Rights, and the fourteenth amendment. 
21. E.g., rights to minimum subsistence, work, education, and essential health care, which in 
this country are furnished only pursuant to statutes and private charity, to the extent they 
are furnished at all. 
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less robust, for instance, than the comparable provisions one will find in the 
modem constitutions of Canada, Australia, Switzerland, or West Germany, 
to name a random few. 
Comparatively speaking, our Constitution does not read well. Nearly two-
thirds of it is, as previously noted, given over to mechanics, i.e., to compli-
cated provisions on the organization of offices with eccentric and differing 
constituencies. And the oriii.nal Constitution exhibits no great affection for 
fully representative (much less more directly democratic) govemment.22 In 
places, it is quaint (e.g., it forbids states to "lay any Duty on Tonnage," it 
provides for the Senate to "chuse" the Vice President when the Electoral 
College fails.) It also has several sanguinary clauses that seem quite forbid-
ding (e.g., it provides that no attainder of treason "shall work Corruption of 
Blood"). 
In brief, read today, from beginning to end, our Constitution actually 
looks quite undistinguished as a complete and ordered political document. 
Its main ideas are more comprehensively reported off shore, in a variety of 
constitutions that, front to back, tend to present themselves better than our 
own. After weathering two centuries remove from 1787 and the scars of 
repeated ad hoc amendment, the Constitution of the United ~tates may be, in 
fact, among the least outwardly impressive constitutions in the world. 
m 
But if neither its formal style, its particular plan for the organization of the 
national government, its separation of powers, its federalism features, nor 
even its Bill of Rights are remarkable or especially distinguished today-if, 
as one says, our Constitution is overall but a raw and ungainly sort of 
American "Rube Goldberg machine" -then what may one claim in its 
favor? Is there nothing that is otherwise special about it, is there no addi-
tional idea in this Constitution, nothing still distinctive and worthwhile 
that has tended to elude most constitutional systems, even now? To the 
contrary, there is, and it is to this idea we now tum. 
By far the most important idea of the Constitution overhangs the several 
features we have already reviewed, distinctive and significant as they once 
were (and in some measure still are). We have overlooked it only because it is 
so much a part of the constitutional furniture we take for granted-as 
though it were native to every constitution, virtually inseparable from the 
definition of "constitution" itsel£23-that we do not separately count it by 
itself. But we should count it (in fact it is not a commonplace feature of 
constitutions). Nearly everything else depends upon its success. It is the idea 
of the constitution as hard law, law written virtually in capital letters 
(LAW), law as meaning reliable law-and law that is reliable partly because 
22. See, e.g., the discussion in notes ~ and II supra. 
23. See that definition again at p. I74 supra. 
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it is not easily altered, law that is hard with all the implications of hard 
law.24 
In a curious fashion, the first proof of the Constitution's singular status as 
hard law is captured right on its face, i.e., in its Rube Goldberg, scarred, and 
semi-archaic look. What one first notices about the Constitution of the 
United States, for instance, is that so much of the original is still there. When 
changes come, moreoever, they come embodied as concrete, visible, specifi-
cally dated additions, i.e., as amendments, each recording its own passage 
into hard law, each reporting a great deal about what we have been through. 
Indeed, the history of the Constitution is, in a deeply instructive way, 
publicly reported very much on its own scarred face. 
This same point can be made by a different metaphor, equally suitable and 
very powerful in its implications: that of the "living constitution," and of 
amendments as a slowly widening series of cambium rings. Real amend-
ments25 mark visible events in the life of the world's oldest Constitution. 
That amendments are difficult to add on goes without saying. Were it 
otherwise-were these Cambium rings easily put on or were the whole 
Constitution subject to periodic popular choice-perhaps it might read 
better and promise a great deal more than it does, but at the high cost of 
diminishing what this Constitution distinctly has meant. The majority of 
the world's constitutions read better than our own not merely because all are 
more recent (which they are), and not merely because many have borrowed 
some of the stronger features of our own (as some have), but because even 
now most are not to the same extent hard law. They may and do fail that idea 
in any of several critical ways. 
Many are not hard law because they are simply not "law" as we under-
stand it in the United States. That is, they cannot be invoked in court and 
they cannot be used by judges, to hold against legislative acts. They are in a 
word political rather than legal instruments. They are grand designs, cornu-
copias of (empty) rights, statements of elaborate rationales of ordered 
powers. They "explain" a great sovereign nation, they lay out its general 
plan of government, articulate its political premises, proclaim its funda-
mental principles and powers, and otherwise just vanish in the night. In 
fact, they lack cash value, for they are what the government (or the control-
ling political party) says they are, and they mean what the government (or 
the controlling party) asserts. They lack a Marbury v. Madison, as it were, 
and they are correspondingly as malleable or as meaningful merely as the 
shifting politics of majoritarian or totalitarian government declare. In 1987 
the vast majority of all national constitutions are still of this sort. Less than 
two dozen are "hard law," in the full American sense. 
24. "hard. adj. I. Resistant to pressure, firm; 2. durable, lasting; 3. difficult to accomplish: 
[and] 4. deaf to some degree." American Heritage Dictionary, p. 600 (1971). Note esp. the 
last point; it is quite frequently overlooked. 
25. Unlike phantom amendments, e.g., amendments made de facto by Congress with judicial 
acquiescence, or amendments effectively supplied by the courts. Both kinds implicitly dis· 
respect the hard law demands of article V; they have none o£ the integrity of cambium rings 
on a living constitution. 
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Alternatively, a constitution may not be hard law because of the relative 
ease with which it can be altered. I have already noted that article V in our 
own Constitution makes alterations in the Constitution difficult. In most 
other written constitutions it is not nearly so hard at all. 26 One may virtually 
declare that, to be hard law a constitution must, in fact, be exceptionally 
difficult to alter, as well as readily enforceable in accessible and profession-
ally serious courts. The American constitution was remarkable in providing 
for both conditions. It retains those strong distinctions, even now. 
The last of the obvious ways in which a Constitution may not be hard law 
lies within the politics of judicial staffing and of judicial review, in respect 
to which there are fundamentally two kinds of threats. The most common-
place of these threats our own Constitution reasonably well protects against, 
namely, the vulnerability of the judiciary to easy removal or to economic 
harassment, a threat effectively removed by the protections of article III. The 
second, however, is implicit in our own constitution and not merely that of 
other countries. It is at the core of our own ·most divisive professional 
disputes. 
By the "politics of judicial staffing and of judicial review," I mean 
nothing more than who gets appointed, and how those appointed may 
behave: whether they in fact strive straightforwardly to give the various 
clauses and cambium rings of the Constitution full faith and credit when 
appropriately pressed to do so (i.e. to apply the whole ·Constitution), or 
whether they may-or may not, depending upon the case and the cause. The 
latter tendency is a strong one even within our own constitutional tradition. 
It is quite clear we remain divided in appraising it, moreover, most of all in 
our assessments of particular judges and of the work of the Supreme Court. 
In a number of nations with written constitutions, the constitution, 
though superior law, is nonetheless weak law because the judges are made to 
be weak-either de facto, in the corruption of their selection (as w.hen the 
appointing powers quite deliberately pick party sycophants) or de jure, by 
their year-to-year vulnerability to removal, reappointment, or recall. We 
have already noted that our own Constitution, in the drafting of article Ill, 
disallowed the latter check on the federal judiciary.27 What remains, then, is 
the cost of thus entrenching the federal judiciary, i.e., the risk of judicial 
hubris, an inclination to read some clauses in and others out. It is in thi~ 
interpretive crevice (left open in any system-it cannot possibly be closed) 
that so much professional combat over "interpreting" our Constitution is 
also waged: from the ad hoc dogmatics of academic terminology (e.g., 
hermeneutics, deconstruction, originalism, varieties of deferentialism, 
26. The Constitution of India provides a clear example. The Constitution of the Soviet Union 
provides another. (Its previous constitution, of 1936, had been amended by the Supreme 
Soviet more than 200 times prior to the comprehensive revision published in 1977. And its 
constitution of 1936 was its third since 1917. 
27. Article III can do nothing to prevent the nomination (and Senate approval) of a weak judge; 
nonetheless, the assurance of life tenure has operated to make poor prophets of some 
(although by no means all) presidents who have counted on a nominee's past acts. 
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noninterpretivism, representativism, nonoriginal interpretivism) to lengthy 
books and articles on the "right" way of doing (and not doing) the business 
of judicial review. 
From an outsider's perspective, i.e., from a mere traveler's point of view, 
the intense passion of American scholars for constructing dominant ratio-
nales of the right way of doing judicial review may seem highly over-
wrought. From within, however, the matter is seen quite differently, and I 
tend to agree with the view from within. These disputes are in fact quite 
important. What is going on underneath is a struggle for the Constitution 
itself, a reprise on the idea of the Constitution as hard law. 
My own view is that judges such as Holmes and the more recent Justice 
Harlan got the matter about right. Each, I think, generally avoided the 
Scylla and Charybdis of judicial review; i.e., each generally declined to treat 
the various clauses in the Constitution either as blank checks (on which 
judges write out their social passions) on the one hand, or as in terrorem 
exclusionary clauses in a commercial insurance contract, clauses to be 
construed with an instinct to reduce them to virtually meaningless terms (as 
some judges have done). In different eras, and in somewhat different ways, 
Holmes and Harlan reflected well on the judicial role. More than most, they 
took the clauses of the Constitution seriously, and they left amendments to 
the processes of article V. 
The general example of Holmes28 and Harlan to one side, I want also to 
provide three case examples of the idea of the Constitution as hard law, 
although I realize that picking any particular cases, especially in this 
company, reopens old differences and invites its own dis proofs. Still, I would 
close with these three: West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette;29 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer;Jo and Ex parte Milligan,Jl a case of 
exemplary significance, decided over a century ago. 
In Barnette, as this audience will recall, the issue was the extent to which 
compulsory flag salutes could be required in the pulbic schools. The cultiva-
tion of a strong spirit of national solidarity in wartime was felt to be at stake; 
the case both arose and was decided during World War II. Moreover, by this 
time the compulsory flag salute requirement of the West Virginia schools 
was utterly commonplace nationally. Its use in the public school setting had 
been enthusiastically approved by virtually every sort of representative 
agency throughout the United States. Even so, it was not sustained against 
the combined weight of religious and of free speech claims, pressed by a 
handful of obstinate Jehovah Witness children and their families. "If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," Justice Robert Jackson 
said in summarizing the most pertinent point, for the Court, "it is that no 
28. Holmes remains a most controversial example; the revisionist literature has been extremely 
harsh. But I expect more favorable opinion to come back to Justice Holmes who, all in all, 
was a very great judge. 
29. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
30. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
31. 71 u.s. 2 (1866). 
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official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein." 
In Youngstown the issue was not such a poignant first amendment matter 
but one merely of separation of powers; it involved the executive seizure of 
steel mills deemed essential by President Truman to sustain the flow of basic 
weapons during the Korean War. Even though the matter was merely that of 
separated power (and even though a passive Congress had not actually acted 
against the President when he directed Secretary Sawyer to take control of the 
mills}, the Court nonetheless affirmed an order to return the mills to private 
hands. "With all its defectS, delays and inconveniences," Jackson insisted, 
"men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government 
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by 
parliamentary deliberations." Then, virtually as a footnote, Jackson added 
the following useful sentences to the case: "Such institutions may be 
destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be the last, not first, to 
give them up." 
Like Barnette and Youngstown, Ex parte Milligan was a case that arose 
during a time of perceived emergency, albeit nearly a century earlier, in 
1864. At issue was the substitution in parts of Indiana of trial by military 
commission rather than by jury, as usually provided by a specific sixth 
amendment guarantee. The government invoked its expected claim of 
exigent circumstances to dispense with the usual forms of indictment and 
trial. The Court, however, disagreed. "The Constitution is a law for rulers 
and people, equally in war and in peace." Absent circumstances exceeding 
those shown in the case, Justice Davis held, the usual fifth and sixth 
amendment standards would have to be met exactly, the risks notwith-
standing.. , 
In each of these cases reasonable persons might (and did) object to the 
rigidity with which the respectively pertinent constitutional clauses were 
applied. The dead hand of those provisions need not have bound the living. 
In each case interpretative judicial license, theories of deference to other 
departments of government, a sober consideration and reweighing of 
competing values, and the like lay at hand. But if one grasps the idea of the 
Constitution as good for all times and not just for some times, one will not 
be overly impressed by these possibilities, even though it was the prosperous 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Steel Corporation and the Copperhead Milligan 
(as well as the Barnette family) who prevailed in these disputes. The idea of 
the Constitution as hard law-resistant to pressure, difficult to accomplish, 
durable, and deaf to some degree-endures. 
